CBN and FDI Outflows to China

CBN and FDI Outflows to chinaIntroduction and search ProblemSince its frugal opening in 1979, chinaw be has function oneness of the knowledge domains largest recipients of inter guinea pig direct investment (FDI). In 2007, inflows to china totalled e trulywhere US$82 one gazillion million, assumeing mainland Chinas cumulative FDI to al more or less US$700 billion for the full stop 1979 to 2007 (CSB 2007). But what has oddly captured some(prenominal) faculty member and popular attention is the finish to which Chinas massive levels of FDI whitethorn be attri provided commensurate to diasporic pagan Chinese capital, what Harvard faculty member John Kao famously bounded the Chinese commonwealth (Kao 1993 24). It has often been insist that around two-thirds of all the foreign investment that has poured into China line of descentated from pagan Chinese life sentence come forwardside of China (e.g., Wolf 2002 134).This scarce level of intra-ethnic investment fe eds something of a headache to mainstream FDI theories, which, at the level of the ho expendhold, tend to explain internationalization as an incremental process resulting from, variously, the pursuit of market power, an knowledgeableising of technological improvements, and the accruement of foreign market knowledge and experience. Protesting against this type of theorizing as under- br separate(a)lyised and occidental-centric, many Asia scholars (who argon often also Asian) developed an selection account drawn upon insights from net income theory and some sociological studies of Chinese firms done in the 1990s. Their accountwhich in this dissertation is referred to as the Chinese capitalism principal sumspans a shape of disciplinary frameworks including anthropology, scotch geography and sociology, maturement stintings, steering, and southboundeast Asia Regional studies, save has at its heart the premise that ethnic Chinese enterprises dominate the economic work ivity of eastern hemisphere Asia and FDI flows into China in large part beca uptake of their competency to draw upon sullen, interlinked networks of mixer/family/political alliances that span national boundaries. These linkages atomic number 18 normally known as Chinese melodic phrase networks (CBN). The assertion that ethnic Chinese engage in pervasive networking on an international scale has become so ubiquitous in popular and pedantic publications that it is normally considered a stylized fact.But is it true thatdespite citizenship in countries with differing social structures, political economies, and historiesthe Chinese diaspora is linked by transnational webs of arduous personalisedistic ties? And subscribe to these webs actuated and facilitated massive flows of FDI to China? If so, this would suggest that ethnic Chinese air operates in a distinctive manner, that it is proper to speak of a Chinese capitalist economy in which flexibly linked Chinese enterprises m ight up to now form a competitive substitute for formally structured Western and Japanese multinational enterprises (MNEs). Alternatively, it has been suggested that the design of CBN might s have in mind be a cultural myth which obscures, possibly exaggerates and distorts, the internationalisation of ethnic Chinese enterprises (Mackie 2000). If soif intra-ethnic networking is ill-defined, oer- express and under- interrogationedwhat should we actualize of the prevalence of the CBN preaching in economics-based disciplines? And, if they are non gaind by networks, how should mainstream FDI theories be amended to account for the fact that at the turn of the twenty-first century we knock so many capital of Singaporean enterprises in China?The main purpose of my query was to move this debate forward. I did so by investigating claims of extensive intra-ethnic networking among the ethnic Chinese with an eye toward enhancing mainstream internationalisation theorising. More specifica lly, I tested whether show of CBN could be found in the transnational expansion into China of randomly-selected Chinese-Singaporean blue-medium- surfaced enterprises (SMEs).This chapter has two main objectives. The first is to present my dissertations research question and to explain wherefore it is classic. The second is to provide an overview of how and wherefore I investigated it as I did. To this end, the take overing section treates the general consideration of my research hassle and reviews the conventional theoretical frameworks that address the phenomenon of internationalisation. Section 1.1.2 explains why it is pregnant that claims of extensive intra-ethnic networking be investigated. Next, the focus is narrowed to the specific research question that was tested. The impression of CBN is carefully defined in Section 1.1.3, and it is conceptually operationalised into testable sub-hypotheses in Section 1.1.4.Background of CBN ClaimsWith some US$30 billion cumulativ e FDI invested in China amid 1979 and 2006, Singapore ranked as Chinas seventh largest source of foreign investment, after Hong Kong, Japan, the Virgin Islands, the United States, Taiwan, and South Korea (CSB, 2007). In 2006, about 70% of the Association for eastward Asian Nations (ASEAN) FDI originated in Singapore, and between 1990 and 2006, over 15,000 Singaporean projects were set up in China. These figures are all the more remarkable tending(p) Singapores weakened size. exhibit onmore, as square as Singapore now is as an investor to China, it is likewise true that China has become important to Singapore as an investment market. Since 1997, Chinaa vacuum cleaner for foreign direct investment, as Lee Kuan Yew has keep goingly called ithas each year received the largest share of FDI by Singaporean entities, renewal Malaysia as Singapores top investment destination (Hamlin 2002). In 2002, FDI to China accounted for over 17% of total Singaporean investment abroad (Departmen t of Statistics 2002). It is clear from these figures that non only are Singaporean transnational enterprises (TNEs) a significant military capability in the rearticulation of China into the orbiculate economy, however that China has become an important factor in the regionalisation of Singaporean firms.How can we account for this tremendous and unprecedented diasporic transnational investment? Two corpuses of literature that purportedly shed come on this phenomenon are critically examined in this dissertation the mainstream internationalisation make up and what I refer to as the Chinese capitalist economy perspective.Three establishs inside the mainstream internationalisation literature are highlighted in this dissertation. The first is theories of the MNE, which grew out of Stephen Hymers germinal work on post-war multinational investment in Europe and has its grow in the utilitarian tradition of classical and neo-classical economics. This corpus of literature has grow ov er the decades to encompass a range of views, but at its message is some version of the argument that MNEs are enterprises which, in response to market imperfection and a desire to exploit proprietary advantages, have internalised activities by investing abroad. A distinctive sub-group of these theories has arisen in response to the spectacular enlarge in exploitation-country MNEs since the 1970s. Within Developing-Country MNE theories, the leading argument is that emerging MNEs from developing countries follow an incremental internationalisation process driven by gradual internal technological accumulation. multinationalisation Process Models is the second important strand inside the mainstream approach. With its roots in behavioural theories of the firm, it offers a more explicitly dynamic approach to apprehension the process by which firms engage in FDI. though there is some variation in the explanation employed in the modelsfor instance, some stress learning and others focu s on technological accumulationand though the process is variously expound as cyclic, stage-based, or evolutionary, a find premise is that internationalisation is incremental by nature, as the firm acquires knowledge necessary for notwithstanding internationalisation.A third major strand within the mainstream approach has explicitly incorporated the concept of network into internationalisation theorisations. It is important to note the schism in the network literature between viewing networks as a form of governance structure versus focussing on networks as social relationships. This has caused a number of interpretational problems and contributed to a apparently irreconcilable divergence between mainstream economics/ military control theories and an approach that has vainglorious out of the sociology discipline. Of the originator, mayhap the most important for this thesis is the Late industrialization framework, which treats the concept of networks as a distinctive mode o f organisation through and through with(predicate) which learning and the adaptation of borrowed technology were combined to promote economic development in a number of late industrialising countries in the 20th century.These tether strands within the mainstream internationalisation construct dominate much of the research on MNEs and FDI but they have their shortcomings. In particularly, many Asia scholars (who were frequently Chinese-speaking Asians) have objected that mainstream internationalisation theories, with their under-socialised and Western roots, cannot decently explain the phenomenon of ethnic Chinese investment in the motherland (Yeung 2000 10). These scholars have sooner drawn upon the insights of network theory and some(prenominal) sociological studies of ethnic Chinese enterprises (that were done in the 1990s) to develop an alternative accountthe Chinese capitalist economy perspectiveto elucidate the specific courtship of ethnic Chinese transnational expansion. As its establish suggests, this large corpus of literature is exclusively concerned with ethnic Chinese enterprises because it is argued that they differ in important respects not only from Japanese and Western firms, but from other developing-country enterprises (Kao 1993).Central to the Chinese Capitalism perspective is the premise that ethnic Chinese firms dominate FDI flows into China, and indeed much of the economic activity of East Asia, because of their ability to form and draw upon dense, interlinked webs of social/family/political relationships that span national boundaries and rest on trust and reciprocation (Hamilton 1996a 17). These relationshipsChinese employment networks (CBN)are variously ascribed to cultural and/or institutional factors and ostensibly give ethnic Chinese TNEs a streng henceed advantage, particularly when entering culturally Chinese markets such(prenominal) as China, while non-ethnic Chinese businesses meet with less triumph (EAAU 1995). As Hami lton-Hart wroteInvestment and trade flows linking Southeast and Northeast Asia have been promoted by network-like relationships among firms and individuals. These relationships have fostered regionalization by reducing the costs and risks of transnational investment (Hamilton-Hart 2002 1).Describing this advantage in an e supernumeraryly enthusiastic manner, Redding wrote that ethnic Chinese capitalism is fundamentally an economic shade characterized by a unique capacity to co-operate (emphasis added Redding 1990 79). And Hamilton, terminal that the Chinese diaspora will elbow out non-Chinese entrants in the China market, wrote many Westerners honestly believe that they have a real chance to contend to the one billion plus Chinese consumers, but I do not believe it will work out this way (Hamilton 1996a 19). Journalists and management gurus have similarly embraced the concept of Chinese business networks (e.g., Seagrave 1996 Backman 1999 and Drucker 1994).The concept of CBN has diachronic roots in the centuries of mass migration that have fostered transnational ethnic Chinese communities which span the world. Many historians have argued that commercial and financial networks based on fictive and agnatic familism, pang or speech-group solidarities, and regionalism, were historically important social channels in some settings, such as for those emigrating to Southeast Asia from southern China. But the Chinese Capitalism literature, taking new life from the handling of networks within the sociology discipline, extended this historical observation nurture. It not only asserted that CBN remained important at the turn of the 21st century, but it emphasized CBN as a distinctive characteristic or skill of the ethnic Chinese. look SignificanceThe skill or special ability to combine a firms resources with the complementary resources of its partners can no doubt be an important organisational capability. Among the benefits, networks get down business transaction c osts, provide for better risk assessment, and lead to spark off decision-making. But is there evidence that networking has been a primary factor in ethnic Chinese transnational expansion? Does it explain why Singaporean FDI has flowed so far afield to China?My research contributes to pedantic understanding in a number of ways. It adds to the scarce academic research that has been published to date on Southeast Asian SMEs, and it contributes to a more exacting explanation of CBN and some of the name associated with it, such as guanxi. But its most significant contributions are to the following three areas 1) theorizing on internationalisation and FDI in general, and ethnic Chinese businesses in particular 2) assessments of whether Singaporean FDI outflows to China wreak actual or faux economic development, and what that implies for evaluations of Singaporean state developmentalism and 3) the use of CBN as a thin state strategy to facilitate economic development and to accommo date an theme China.Chinese Capitalism and Internationalisation TheorisingFurther research into CBN is necessary to enhance theorising in both the Chinese Capitalism and mainstream internationalisation corpuses. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the Chinese Capitalism literature has to date suffered from a heartbreaking lack of empirical evidence. Articles that discuss CBN do often reference prior academic works, but when canvass these references typically are revealed to be rather insubstantial. There is also a marked tendency to repeat, mantra-like, the same three or four genuine works on the subject, but because these studies were largely descriptive and based on a tiny sample size, they do not provide an adequate buttressing for the claim of extensive intra-ethnic business networking. Moreover, there have been most no rigorous cross-cultural comparative studies, and little consideration has been given to the drawbacks and costs of operating through networks.My investigat ion into CBN also speaks to the appropriateness of the academic niche that has developed for Chinese Business. A virtual phalanx of Chinese business experts has popped up since the late 1990s, and it is common to find universities that have consecrated a Chairor even a departmentto the business practices of this specific ethnic group. In contrast, one is less likely to find similar attention to Russian or Indian business studies. Of course, this is delinquent in part to the staggering market potential represented by Chinas 1.3 billion population, but it can also be traced to the essentially culturalist assertion that ethnic Chinese have unique business practices such as CBN.In fact, CBN has become so widely accepted that much of the academic discussion has shifted away from directly considering ethnic Chinese ties towards as histrion cross-comparative approach that is problematic because it contrasts the fact of CBN with the lack of networking in other cultures. look into into h ow, for example, Nordic or Indian networks are not as strong as CBN have become common. In short, though some of the inside information of CBN may be contested, the general premise of the Chinese Capitalism literature has largely been accepted and is influential. This has been especially true in the international business rubric, but references to CBN abound in economics-based disciplines as rise. For example, in an Institute for International economics special report describing the lessons South Korea should learn from CBN, developboyish argued In the 1990s, they the Chinese diaspora formulated an international strategy to form a global network of overseas ChineseThe experiences of overseas Chinese networks would be good models for Korea (Young 2003 50). And how did Young define CBN? They are led by the unique Chinese personal network, guanxi, which links individuals, nucleotidetown associations, business associations in the same industry, and associations of people with the s ame family name (Young 2003 53).Mainstream internationalisation theories also have significant shortcomings. The economics discipline has a long history of neglectingoften completely omittingthe social, political, and historical context in which firms are embedded. A large gulf between mainstream economics and other social sciences has developed, making each seem increasingly irrelevant to the other. Economics many insights and strengths are too often viewed as inapplicable to other disciplines, and disciplinary cross-fertilisation has been hampered. Sloppy theorisations arise and thrive in such an environment.One of the most significant ways that evidence for CBN affects mainstream theorising lies in its hint that informally-linked enterprises might serve as functional substitutes for Western and Japanese MNEs. freehanded firms, especially multinationals, enjoy significant benefits of scale and celestial orbit as well as learning and productivity advantages that are unavailable to smaller, isolated firms (Nolan 2001). In contrast, the relatively small size of ethnic Chinese firms, which tend to be family-owned and -controlled, is considered by mainstream theorists to limit their competitiveness in international business. But perhaps the 21st century will indeed be a network age in which the economies of scale that dominated in the previous menstruation seem to have given way to network economies (Young 2003 33). If so, then the concept of CBN suggests that ethnic Chinese firms are informally bound together in such a way that they can duplicate, and maybe exceed, the benefits derived from the larger scope of MNEs (Borrus 1997). This intriguing possibilitythat the limitations on competitiveness inherent in a family-controlled firm may be overcome by networkingprovides a further reason for why my research into claims of extensive CBN is significant. Moreover, as my results demonstrate in Chapter 5, irrespective of whether extensive intra-ethnic networking is taking the place, the effects of the CBN discourse are thoughtful and have affected FDI decision-making. Mainstream economic theory would be improved if economists took a more open-minded and sophisticated approach to appreciating, understanding, and incorporating such social dimensions.Singaporean Development(alism) Actual or Faux?My research contributes in another key way. Empirical evidence (or its absence) of CBN should factor into evaluations of Singapores level of economic development and, hence, assessments of the states developmental policies.FDI from Singapore to China has not only been large but it go alongs to grow. though this transnational expansion has been actively promoted by the ruling Peoples Action caller (PAP) through various policies, programmes, and an official discourse on creating an international economic wing, the state would have us interpret Singaporean investment in China as emergence economic maturation, a sign that Singapore is moving away from M NE-led development to a stage in which home-grown capitalists turn into new areas. Outward direct investments are beneficial to both firms and the home country as they provide access to strategic assets, technology, skills, natural resources, and markets. It is especially important for a small state with limited market size and resources to be able to access international markets and connect with global merchandise/knowledge systems.The degree to which Singapore has experienced the social and technological pass on associated with economic development has been a contentious subject for the PAP-state (e.g., Krugman 1994), and it is perennially offensive to demonstrate its effectiveness. As discussed in Chapter 8, signs of declining popular support for the PAP in election results since 1988, in attendant with a series of accumulation crises over the past two decades, have the state very worried.Though know as highly intrusive, the state has largely been given credit for developin g Singapore from a sleepy entrept into a major communications hub with a population that enjoys one of the worlds highest per capita incomes. Since the 1990s, the Singaporean state has to a inter-group communication degree officially embraced and propagated a (selectively Confucian) culturalist discourse alongside calls for the development of an external sector to help insulate the country from downturns in the world economy. Is this to that extent another sign of an enduring comprehensive developmental state (Pereira 2007) cheerleading the march towards the next stage in Singapores economic development, this time, in part, by further latent networking capabilities in its ethnic Chinese population? This might imply that after years of neglect, the PAP-developmental state has reached a stage where it is prioritising the engagement of local anaesthetic capitalists in its economic strategies (Haggard and Cheng 1987). For while the developmental state is expected to be the most powe rful political and economic player during much of development, at some point state strategies should pay off and produce a vigorous and competitive domestic capitalist class (Periera 2007 3).But what should we make of Singaporean FDI to China, and the states insistence that these flows are rooted in Chinese exceptionalism, if evidence suggests that CBN claims are over-stated? Justifications for Singapores domineering one-party state have always pointed to the Republics strong economic performance. If public proclamations about Chinese business networking turn out to be rather more wishful thinking than actual practice, then the government may be judged to have taken a serious mis-step, especially considering its own massive investments in China and the problems associated with some of them (, The unseasoned Frontier, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 6, 2001, BY Ben Dolven e.g., the Suzhou Industrial Park). The consequence would be that Singaporean investment in China represen ts, at least in part, something other than the cool, independent economic rationalism upon which PAP political legitimacy rests concerns might be raised about the optimum use of resources and the degree to which political considerations have lead the state to invest severely in China itself, push its GLC sector to do so as well, and create a discourse in which local capitalists are encourage to make the risky move to China.More importantly, high levels of Singaporean FDI to China might not represent maturation out of the MNE-dependency that is widely recognize to now seriously limit economic growth and make the island-state exceptionally vulnerable to fluctuations in a world economy beyond its control. And it may hint that the hither-to developmental PAP-state is losing some of the political insulation, technocratic skills, and discipline it needs to continue to lead Singapore.In summary, my research contributes to assessments of the PAP-developmental state. Should Singaporean FD I to China be construe as a sign of economic development, with all the benefits this implies for a small state that has to date been extremely exposed to world economic conditions? Or, alternatively, is it at heart a sort of faux development that does not bring the social and technological progress that accompanies actual development? This important depicted objectthe role of the PAP-states CBN discourse in FDI decision-makingis discussed at length in conjunction with the results of my research in Chapter 8.CBN as a Small State dodgingMy research also contributes to an understanding of how CBN and the discourse surrounding can be used by a small state wishing to clout nail above its weight in its engagement with the international environment, especially an ascendant China. By this I am referring to Singapores strategic use of culture and ethnicity to further its economic and national security/foreign policy goals.Chinas growing economic and military strength is increasingly pres enting a dramatic challenge to world, particularly East Asian, power relations. Tapping into (or manufacturing) the Chinese-ness of a states population or subgroup may be an excellent strategy for accommodating a rising China, especially for small states such as Singapore which are looking for ways to encompass for their power deficit. A small state faces an integration dilemma when it considers Chinas growing markets and reach (Goetschel 1998 28). It can insist on economic and security liberty but risk being abandoned or isolated, with the disadvantages this would like cause. Or it can accept a constraint on its freedom to act in ways that are contrary to Chinas economic and security goals and instead try to accommodate, identify with, even in some sense commingle with, China. Stressing as it does not just civilisational fluency but actual networks with China, the CBN discourse functions as a novel way of enabling Singapore to do the latter.Whether Singapores strategy might su ccessfully be imitated by other small states remains to be seen. It is interesting to speculate how, for example, Africas over 7 million ethnic Chinese and Perus 1.3 million, might factor into their states strategic possibilities for engaging China (e.g., Mung 2008).Singapore has tried to modify the international environment through its cultural discourse in another sense. As discussed in Chapter 8, this former British colony has for the two decades heavily marketed itself as the Gateway to the East. Its stated goal since Singapores regionalisation drive was announced in 1993 has been to be the regional hub, a place where MNEs locate their headquarters and higher value-added operations (such as research and development), while situating lower value-added parts in China and other areas of East Asia where labour is cheaper. The clear implication of the self-orientalising discourse of CBN is that Western firms are flimsy to be successful if they invest directly in China. They need ins tead to engage a mediating force, such as Singaporean firms, in wander to become part of the transnational networks in which Chinese business is accomplished, or so the story goes. As a Singaporean government subgenus Pastor put itThose who have knowledge of the culture and cultural nuances are able to lower business risks for foreigners. The Chinese overseas understand Chinese culture because they are ethnically Chinese themselves, but they also understand the world outsideThey are like modems. They modulate and demodulate and add value in the process. (George Yeo, quoted in Crovitz 1993 18).With its middleman familiarity with both East and West and its purportedly dense transnational networks with China, the CBN discourse therefore places Singapore in the enviable niche position of knowledge arbitrageur (Tan, K.B. Eugene 2006). It is a striking example of the claiming of territoriality over knowledge (Brown and Menkhoff 2006), in both a conceptual and quite typographical error s ense.Defining the Concept of CBNUnfortunately, a clear-cut definition of the concept of Chinese business networking does not currently exist. Much of the Chinese Capitalism literature is largely descriptive rather than theoretically precise, and to the degree that a definition is specified it varies significantly from author to author. Some scholars discussing networks have stressed their origin in qiaoxiang (usually defined as ancestral homeland ties), kinship, religious, and/or school ties (Hamilton 1996 Liu 1998, 1999 Yeung 2000d). Other scholars have used a broader definition that characterises Chinese business networks as long-term, but extensible, personalized networks, based on trust and upheld by the indispensability of reputation within such a system (Tracy et al. 2001 262). These are contrasted with what are characterised as the generally weak, situational, and non-enduring ties of the West (Zahra et al. 1999 45).A particular problem with the fuzziness surrounding CBN is t hat this concept is oftenand unhelpfullyconfused with guanxi. desire CBN, the latter term suffers from a lack of definitional rigor. Guanxi has commonly been translated as both connections and relationships, but neither of these terms adequately gives a sense of how this multi-faceted concept is commonly understood by Chinese. A more sophisticated definition is, the concept of drawing on connections in order to secure favors in personal relations (Luo 2007 2).There are obvious similarities between the concepts of CBN and guanxi, but closer scrutiny of the academic literature as well as the results of my fieldwork led me to a conclusion, shared with a few researchers (e.g., Fan 2002), that guanxi is not identical to CBN. For example, it is not generally considered to be something that is exchanged between family members or childhood friends, nor is it usually described as having any sense of qiaoxiang or ancestral homeland sentiment. Also, unlike CBN, guanxi has on occasion been des cribed quite negatively by a few researchers. Fan, for example, argued that guanxi and corruption are inextricably intertwined in 21st century China (2002). This assessment was supported by my fieldwork, as most of the SME owners I interviewed ascribed negative qualities to the practice of guanxi. Some of them described guanxi as a paymenton occasion they used the term bribethat essential be paid to local government officials as a cost of doing business in China. Others equated it with an obligation to pay for unstinting dinners and parties for customers or suppliers in the (frequently forlorn) hope of receiving enough business in descend to justify these outlays. When one of my interviewees was asked to define guanxi, he summed it up as, If you want to do business in China, you must pay to play (Interviewee 6).In summary, though any attempt to definitively delineate these two unwieldy and messy terms (Luo 2007) is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the results of my research , combined with a close scrutiny of the academic literature, led me to the conclusion that they are not identical. While creating guanxi with someone may lead to a close networking relationship, it should not be confused with the networking relationship itself.So, though these concepts overlap, it is important to carefully define and distinguish between them. however in many accounts of Chinese business practices these two termsguanxi and CBNare used as though they were interchangeable. As discussed further in Chapter 5, the frequent conflation of what are actually two separate concepts adds to the confusion surrounding intra-ethnic networking and has important ramifications for my research conclusions.In light of the definitional jumble surrounding CBN, it was important in this thesis that the concept be defined in such as way as to convey the general intent of the Chinese Capitalism literature, yet be specific enough to be rigorously tested. To this end, I chose to draw upon the definition of Chinese business networking suggested by Gomez and Hsiao (2001). They argued that the Chinese Capitalism literature is characterised by an emphasis on Chinese exclusivity, a special conception of trust, and an explicit challenge to existing theories of transnational expansion. Thus, contrary to the very broad definitions typically put forth or assumed, the concept of CBN must necessarily imply a precise, strong connection among businessmen that goes beyond the common, and casual, use in the West of the term business networking (Gomez and Hsiao 2001). More specifically, Gomez and Hsiao claimed that the concept should be reserved forThe e